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INTRODUCTION
It is the day before Thanksgiving. You are in your kitchen busily
preparing food for relatives who will begin arriving from out of town
the next day. The doorbell rings. You open the door to find a city
official, who hands you an eviction notice. After investigating why you
are being evicted, you learn that your home is being condemned to
make way for a new private development, complete with condomini-
ums and retail stores. The house, which you bought a few years ago
and worked three jobs to keep, is located in a great neighborhood and
comes with a spectacular water view. In an effort to save your home,
you, along with your neighbors who are facing the same plight, file a
lawsuit to enjoin the city from continuing with the condemnation pro-
ceedings. Your case makes its way through the court system and,
nearly five years later, reaches the United States Supreme Court. The
fate of the home you have worked so hard for hinges on the meaning
the Court gives two words found in the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution: public use.3
When the Supreme Court released its opinion in Kelo v. City of
New London,4 this past summer, it unleashed a firestorm of public crit-
icism.' At no time in recent memory has the Court managed to univer-
sally irk the basic notions of fairness and justice held by so many
across the political spectrum. 6 The Court's decision to allow govern-
ment, through the power of eminent domain, to condemn the private
property of one party in order to turn it over to another party justified
only by some conceivable public benefit7 sparked outrage throughout
the nation. Polls taken immediately after the release of the opinion
1. SAM CooKE, (What a) Wonderful World (RCA Records 2005) (1960).
2. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
3. Susette Kelo, Op-Ed, Eminent Domain Up Close, THE WASH. TIMES, Sept. 20,
2005, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/commentary/20050919-085408-
323 lr.htm.
4. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2655.
5. Editorial, Hands Off Our Homes, ECONOMIST, Aug. 18, 2005, available at http://
www.economist.com/world/na/displayStory.cfm?story_id=4298759.
6. Don't Kelo My House, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2006, at A16.
7. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668.
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indicated the American public's confidence in the Supreme Court was
at historic lows."
Members of both houses of Congress and state legislators around
the nation, in response to pressure from constituents eager to prevent a
similar scenario from unfolding in their own backyards, scrambled to
enact laws limiting the power of eminent domain.9 In North Carolina,
legislators contemplated bills and a constitutional amendment to
clearly exclude economic development as a justification for private
property takings, 10 something North Carolina law now arguably
permits.
Media accounts of the Court's opinion in Kelo correctly reported
the case hinged on the Court's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause, which states: "[N]or shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation."" However, Justice John
Paul Stevens, writing for the majority, more precisely framed the
parameters of the Court's inquiry: "The disposition of this case there-
fore turns on the question of whether the City's development plan
serves a 'public purpose. ' 1 2 In fact, the majority opinion noted that
the Court, over time, has completely abolished any distinction between
public purpose and public use and dismissed any differentiation
between the two as a product of nineteenth-century jurisprudence. 13
While the subtlety of the difference between these two concepts
escaped the attention of most commentators and reporters, the ramifi-
cations of their merger extend far beyond the context of eminent
domain. The North Carolina Constitution, like most other state con-
stitutions, contains provisions restricting the raising and spending of
tax money to public purposes only. 14 The Kelo decision is the latest
example of the gradual erosion of the public purpose doctrine by state
and federal courts that, combined with the refusal of judges and legis-
8. HearThelssues.com, Americans On: The Supreme Court, http://www.hearthe
issues. com/americanson-supremecourt-g.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
9. Don't Kelo My House, supra note 6.
10. Paul Chesser, Kelo Focuses Liberty Concerns, CAROLINA JOURNAL ONLINE, Aug.
25, 2005, http://carolinajournal.com/exclusives/display-exclusive.html?id=2735.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
12. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663.
13. Id. at 2662.
14. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1) explicitly restricts the power of taxation to "public
purposes only." The North Carolina Supreme Court extended this restriction to the
ability of state and local governments to spend taxpayer money in Mitchell v. North
Carolina Industrial Development Financing Authority, 159 S.E.2d 745, 749-50 (N.C.
1968) ("The power to appropriate money from the public treasury is no greater than
the power to levy the tax which put the money in the treasury.").
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lative bodies to set clearly defined boundaries for what qualifies as a
public purpose, has detrimentally affected the constitutional rights of
every American. This comment argues an amendment to the North
Carolina Constitution clearly defining "public purpose" is needed to
reverse this trend and to ensure state and local government entities do
not act in a manner inconsistent with this limitation as it was origi-
nally intended. Such a remedy is specifically permitted under Kelo, 15
and would protect North Carolinians from the numerous possibilities
for abuse at the hands of an ever-permissive and severely eroded public
purpose doctrine.
As the law in North Carolina currently stands, the state may not
only use the power of eminent domain to confiscate one party's private
property for the benefit of another but may theoretically also use tax-
payer dollars to finance the redevelopment of the confiscated property.
This concern becomes especially salient in light of controversial busi-
ness-incentive packages passed by the North Carolina General Assem-
bly during recent years. It is within this framework that several cases
have arisen in North Carolina courts during the past decade challeng-
ing the constitutionality of state and local governments' use of public
tax revenue to entice private businesses to locate within the state.
Most recently, in June 2005, the North Carolina Institute for Constitu-
tional Law filed suit on behalf of a group of taxpayers seeking to have
an incentives package granted to entice computer giant Dell, Inc., to
build a manufacturing plant near Winston-Salem declared unconstitu-
tional. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that the $279 million deal -
the largest incentives package in state history 16 - was unconstitu-
tional because it ran afoul of the public purpose restrictions found
within the North Carolina Constitution.' F
While, as of this writing, the state and local government entities
responsible for putting together the deal that lured Dell to North Caro-
lina have not invoked eminent domain to accomplish their objectives,
such a use in future business incentive packages is certainly not
incomprehensible. In fact, the North Carolina Supreme Court has, on
several occasions, analogized the restrictions of the public purpose
15. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668.
16. David Rice, N.C.'s Offer to Dell Largest in State History, WINSTON-SALEM
JOURNAL, Nov. 5, 2004, at Al.
17. These allegations were premised on the theory that the "public purpose"
restrictions contained in Article V, Sections 2(1) and (7) were violated because the
Dell incentives package provided "direct government subsidies for a private business
enterprise" the benefits of which would accrue primarily to "Dell and Dell's
shareholders" making them "not for a 'public purpose only."'
2006] 293
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doctrine with respect to the government's exercise of its eminent
domain powers with its exercise of the powers of taxation.' 8 Further-
more, the court has explicitly held that once a proposed expenditure of
tax revenue is established to be for a public purpose, government can
use its power of eminent domain to acquire private property to accom-
plish the purpose of the expenditure.' 9 This is true even if the result is
to transfer that private property to a private company for its own use
and benefit.
2 °
At the heart of the debate over the use of business incentives and
eminent domain is the meaning and scope of the public purpose doc-
trine. The North Carolina Supreme Court has twice noted "a slide-rule
definition of public purpose for all time cannot be formulated."'21
Consequently, with no clear definition of public purpose in place,
North Carolina courts have permitted an increasing number of activi-
ties to qualify asa public purpose.
Although a strict, all-purpose definition for "public purpose," or
any other legal term of art, would likely prove cumbersome and there-
fore ineffective, it is clear that now, after the Kelo decision, the public
supports clear limits on what actions government can undertake
under the guise of a public purpose. This comment, in Part I, traces
the gradual erosion and decline of the public purpose doctrine in
North Carolina from its roots in the Constitution of 1868 to recent
North Carolina court decisions interpreting its meaning and scope. In
examining the public purpose doctrine as it is addressed in North Car-
olina case law, four distinct categories of cases where the term has
been invoked and applied are analyzed. Part II proffers a definition of
"public purpose" as set forth by the cases discussed in Part I and pro-
poses a more stringent test for courts and public bodies to apply in
determining whether a proposed government expenditure satisfies the
public purpose requirements of the North Carolina Constitution. Part
11 further argues that the public purpose doctrine, as it is now defined
by the North Carolina courts, is inadequate to safeguard public funds
from abuse by private interests. Accordingly, this Part contends a
clearer, more stringent definition should be formulated as an amend-
ment to the North Carolina Constitution. Finally, the comment con-
cludes by asserting now, in the aftermath of Kelo, is the appropriate
18. E.g., Briggs v. City of Raleigh, 141 S.E. 597 (N.C. 1928).
19. Mitchell, 159 S.E.2d at 755.
20. Id.
21. Piedmont Triad Airport Auth. v. Urbine, 554 S.E.2d 331, 332 (N.C. 2001)
(quoting Mitchell, 159 S.E.2d at 750).
294 [Vol. 28:291
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time for the courts and the North Carolina General Assembly to
address this issue.
I. THE ERODING PUBLIC PURPOSE DOCTRINE
A. Roots of the Public Purpose Doctrine in North Carolina
1. Constitutional Evolution
North Carolina's public purpose doctrine traces its origins to the
Constitution of 1868. The State of North Carolina has adopted three
different constitutions throughout its history.22 The Constitution of
1868 was adopted after the Civil War and contained much more detail
than the state's original constitution, adopted in 1776.23 Included
among these details were specific restrictions regarding the manner
and items for which state governmental entities could raise and spend
money.24 However, it was not until seventy years after its adoption that
a provision with wording similar to the public purpose doctrine found
in the current constitution was inserted.25 In 1936, voters ratified an
amendment to Article V, Section 3 of the Constitution of 1868, provid-
ing in relevant part: "Taxes shall be levied only for public purposes, and
every act levying a tax shall state the object to which it is to be
applied. '26 Some commentators have suggested the motive behind the
insertion of the "public purpose" qualifier in this amendment was to
make restrictions on government taxing and spending less prohibi-
tive.27 The current state constitution, adopted in 1971, uses the
phrase "public purpose," or some variant thereof, a total of six times.
The phrase appears three times in Article V, which regulates the power
of state and municipal governments to raise and spend money,28 and
three times in Article XIV, which pertains to miscellaneous functions
of state and local governments, including the conservation of natural
resources. 
29
22. John V. Orth, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION 1 (1995).
23. Id. at 13.
24. John H. Vernon III, Comment, The Public Purpose Doctrine Revisited, 3
INTRAMURAL L. REV. WAKE FOREST 37, 41 (1967).
25. N.C. SECRETARY OF STATE, NORTH CAROLINA GOVERNMENT, 1585-1974: A
NARRATIVE AND STATISTICAL HISTORY 920-21 (John L. Cheney, Jr. ed., 1975).
26. Id.
27. Vernon, supra note 24.
28. N.C. CONST. art. V, §§ 2, 4.
29. Id. at art. XIV, § 5.
2006] 295
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2. Loan Association v. Topeka: Setting a National Standard
The United States Supreme Court first recognized the principle
that the power of taxation is reserved only for public purposes in its
1875 ruling in Loan Ass'n v. Topeka.30 In Topeka, the Court considered
the constitutionality of a statute enacted by the state legislature of Kan-
sas authorizing the City of Topeka to issue and donate bonds, payable
with taxpayer money, to a manufacturer of iron bridges to entice the
manufacturer to build a plant within the city.3' The Court condemned
the practice of taking public money through taxation and, in turn, giv-
ing it to private parties. The majority held doing so was "perverting
the right of taxation, which can only be exercised for a public use, to
the aid of individual interests and personal purposes of profit and
gain. "32
While the Court unambiguously pronounced, "there can be no
lawful tax which is not laid for a public purpose," it also acknowl-
edged, "it may not be easy to draw the line in all cases so as to decide
what is a public purpose in this sense and what is not."'33
This case also provided what was perhaps the first useful test
given by any court for delineating public from non-public purposes.
Included among the factors the Court stated should be considered:
[Tihe course and usage of the government, the objects for which taxes
have been customarily and by long course of legislation levied, what
objects or purposes have been considered necessary to the support and
for the proper use of the government, whether State or municipal, law-
fully pertains to this and is sanctioned by time and the acquiescence of
the people may well be held to belong to the public use, and proper for
the maintenance of good government, though this may not be the only
criterion of rightful taxation.34
As in nearly every opinion that followed, the Topeka decision
afforded great deference to the will and judgment of legislative bodies
in deciding what expenditures qualify as public purposes. 35 Some
state courts afterwards expressly rejected the Court's holding in
Topeka. Those courts argued later opinions by the Court undermined
30. Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655 (1875).
31. Id. at 658.
32. Id. at 659.
33. Id. at 664.
34. Id. at 665.
35. Id. at 664 ("It is undoubtedly the duty of the legislature which imposes or
authorizes municipalities to impose a tax to see that it is not to be used for purposes of
private interest instead of a public use, and the courts can only be justified in
interposing when a violation of this principle is clear and the reason for interference
cogent.").
[Vol. 28:291296
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many of Topeka's pronouncements.36 The opinion, however, is still
probative in determining the basis of factors considered by courts
today in determining what activities qualify as a public purpose. In
fact, the North Carolina Supreme Court incorporated a significant por-
tion of the Topeka decision, including the public purpose test quoted
above, in an opinion striking down the use of taxpayer funds to con-
struct a municipal hotel.37
3. Wood v. Commissioners of Oxford: Establishing Public
Purpose in North Carolina
The foundation for the North Carolina public purpose doctrine
was laid by the North Carolina Supreme Court's 1887 opinion in Wood
v. Commissioners of Oxford.38 In Wood, the court upheld the constitu-
tionality of an act of the General Assembly permitting municipalities
to use public funds to purchase stock in railroad companies that
agreed to build railroads through them, upon the authorization of a
majority of voters in the municipality.39
Despite declaring the act constitutional, the Wood court made it
clear all taxation and expenditures must be for a public purpose.4 °
Although at the time there was no express state constitutional provi-
sion requiring public funds be raised or spent for a public purpose,
Wood, like Topeka, implied this requirement was an inherent limitation
on government power by virtue of the fact that the funds were raised
from the public. 41 The Wood opinion also set out its own definition of
a public purpose:
It may not always be easy to apply the rule of law to determine what is
a legitimate object of such expenditures. It is clear, however, that they
may be made for such public improvements and advantages as tend
directly to provide for and promote the general good, convenience and
safety of the county or town making them, as an organized community,
36. Common Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1, 26 (Me. 1983) ("Topeka has been
substantially undermined by later Supreme Court decisions making clear that the
Court will defer to the states in the area of taxation so as to permit local economic
experimentation.").
37. Nash v. Town of Tarboro, 42 S.E.2d 209, 211 (N.C. 1947).
38. Wood v. Comm'rs of Oxford, 2 S.E. 653 (N.C. 1887).
39. Id. at 656.
40. Id. at 655 ("[The General Assembly] may confer upon [municipalities] power
to raise revenue by levying taxes and otherwise, and to use and apply the same for all
legitimate public purposes, and likewise to create debts and issue their obligations to
pay money for the like public purposes, except as its powers may be restrained by
constitutional limitations." (emphasis added)).
41. Id.
2006]
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although the advantage derived may not reach every individual citizen
or taxpayer residing there.
4 2
Considered together, Topeka and Wood firmly establish the exis-
tence of a "public purpose" restriction on the government's authority
to collect and appropriate tax revenue and provide a basis for the opin-
ions that follow on the issue in North Carolina.
B. A Sliding Standard: The Case Law and the Public Purpose Doctrine
Since Topeka and Wood, four general categories of cases have
developed providing insight into the factors North Carolina courts use
to test whether a government action meets the requirements of the pub-
lic purpose doctrine. The first category involves cases dealing with the
distinction between public and private functions when determining
the liability of government-created entities in tort claims. The second
category includes cases dealing with delineation between public and
private functions to determine tax liability for government-created enti-
ties. The third category encompasses cases dealing with the definition
of "public purpose" in the context of eminent domain. The fourth and
largest category includes taxpayer suits requiring courts to apply the
public purpose doctrine to determine the constitutionality of an
expenditure of public money. This comment discusses each of these
categories of cases in the above-mentioned order with a special focus
on the final two categories, as these appear to encompass the majority
of cases most likely to arise involving the public purpose doctrine in
North Carolina.
1. Public Purpose as a Test for Tort Liability
Although the principle of sovereign immunity is well established
in North Carolina, courts have held a governmental entity may be sub-
ject to liability in tort if it is performing functions not considered of a
traditional "public" nature. One of the first cases on record to address
this issue was Rhodes v. City of Asheville.43 The Rhodes opinion, for the
first time, recognized that while all government activities must qualify
as a "public purpose, government often wears two different hats: it
performs "proprietary" functions, which are of a "ministerial or corpo-
rate character," but can also perform more traditional "governmental"
42. Id.
43. 52 S.E.2d 371 (N.C. 1949).
44. Id. at 373.
[Vol. 28:291
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functions that involve making "judicial, discretionary, or legislative"
decisions.45
The delineation between "governmental" and "proprietary" func-
tions was the deciding factor in a 1975 case in which the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court held a municipally owned and operated hospital
could be subject to tort liability for the negligent acts of one of its
employees.46 In Sides v. Cabarrus Memorial Hospital, Inc., the court
stated "governmental" functions "are those historically performed by
the government, and which are not ordinarily engaged in by private
corporations."47 "Proprietary functions," the court noted, are often
those that involve a "monetary charge of some type" generally in
excess of the cost of the services rendered, although actual profit gen-
eration is not a necessity for this type of public function.4"
The North Carolina Court of Appeals further refined the distinc-
tion between governmental and proprietary functions in Pulliam v.
City of Greensboro.49 The court held two Greensboro residents could
recover damages when the sewer system the city maintained backed up
into their home while the city crews were attempting to unstop sewer
mains.5 ° In Pulliam, the court noted while providing sewer services
had often been considered a traditional "governmental" function, the
trend was toward privatization. 5' The court added the operation of a
public sewer system was one of the "public enterprises" listed in Sec-
tion 160A-311 of the North Carolina General Statutes, all of which the
courts had recognized as "proprietary" functions of local govern-
ment.52 Included among the other "public enterprises" the statutes
authorize municipalities to operate are the following: electric power
generation, transmission, and distribution systems; water supply and
distribution systems; gas production, storage, transmission, and distri-
bution systems; public transportation systems; solid waste collection
and disposal systems and facilities; cable television systems; off-street
parking facilities and systems; and airports.53
This category of cases demonstrates while North Carolina courts
have held a wide variety of government activities, including those in
direct competition with the private sector, can fall within the purview
45. Id.
46. Sides v. Cabarrus Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 213 S.E.2d 297, 304 (N.C. 1975).
47. Id. at 303.
48. Id.
49. 407 S.E.2d 567 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991).
50. Id. at 571.
51. Id. at 568-69.
52. Id. at 569-70.
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-311 (2005).
2006] 299
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of a "public purpose," there are at least two distinct categories of pub-
lic purposes: "governmental" functions and "proprietary" functions.
Judicial recognition of the different types of public purposes also has
been central to North Carolina courts' determinations as to what types
of activities can subject governmental bodies to tax liability.
2. Public Purpose as a Test for Tax Liability
Article 5, Section 2(3) of the North Carolina Constitution
expressly exempts "property belonging to the state, counties, and
municipal corporations" from taxation. 4 However, there is a great
deal of conflicting case law considering whether property owned by a
government entity must be used for a "public purpose" to fall within
one of these tax-exempt categories.
In its first holding on the issue, the North Carolina Supreme
Court abided by the principle of absolute sovereign immunity, holding
any property owned by a state or local government was automatically
exempt from taxation, regardless of whether its purpose was a public
one.5 5 The court later clarified its stance in Wells v. Housing Authority,
stating it was up to the courts to decide what activities constitute a
public purpose by "looking to the end sought to be reached and to the
means to be used, rather than to statutory declarations to aid its deci-
sion."' 56 The Wells court also appeared to mandate that a governmen-
tal body exist for a public purpose to escape state and local tax
liability.57
The court ultimately settled the question of whether a govern-
ment-owned property may be subject to local taxation nearly forty
years later with its holding in In re Appeal of University of North Caro-
lina.58 Here, the court unequivocally declared, "[AIll property of the
University of North Carolina is tax exempt due solely to its ownership
by the State of North Carolina. 59 In reaching this resolution, the
court overruled the line of cases endorsing the requirement that prop-
erty be used for a public purpose in order to be exempt from
60taxation.
This category of cases is instructive in determining what sorts of
government activities North Carolina courts have considered "public
54. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(3).
55. Town of Andrews v. Clay County, 156 S.E. 855, 857 (N.C. 1931).
56. 190 S.E. 693, 695 (N.C. 1938).
57. Id.
58. 268 S.E.2d 472 (N.C. 1980).
59. Id. at 474.
60. Id. at 478.
300 [Vol. 28:291
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purposes." First, in Wells, the North Carolina Supreme Court gave two
considerations for courts to use in determining whether a government
activity constitutes a public purpose: (1) the end to be reached and (2)
the means to be used.6 1 Wells further established the courts have the
authority to review legislative decisions as to what constitutes a public
purpose.62
Additionally, while it is clear from In re Appeal of University of
North Carolina that all property owned by a governmental entity in
North Carolina is exempt from taxation regardless of its use, the cases
considering the role public purpose plays in determining tax liability
give rise to the implication that the courts recognize not all functions
of government are public purposes. If no such recognition existed and
all functions of government were presumed to be public purposes,
there would be no need for the courts to have even considered the
cases in this category in the first place. That the court in In re Appeal
of University of North Carolina specifically noted all state property was
exempt from taxation regardless of its use clearly demonstrates a recog-
nition of such a distinction.
North Carolina courts, in these first two categories of public-pur-
pose cases, have broken down governmental activities using a two-
tiered approach. First, two different types of governmental activities
exist: those that constitute "public purposes" and those that do not.
Second, among those governmental activities that constitute "public
purposes," some are traditional "governmental" functions while other
are non-traditional "proprietary" functions.
The delineations provide an important framework from which to
view the next two categories of cases: eminent domain and taxpayer
suits. Nearly all of the current judicial changes to the public purpose
doctrine are occurring on the state and national levels within these
two categories.
3. Public Purpose in Eminent Domain Cases
The issue of public purpose in the context of eminent domain first
surfaced in City of Charlotte v. Heath, where the North Carolina
Supreme Court reiterated two long-established principles: (1) when
government exercises its powers of eminent domain, "private property
can be taken only for a public purpose and upon just compensation;"
and (2) the determination of what is a public purpose or public use is
one for the courts.6" The Heath court held the condemnation of pri-
61. Wells, 190 S.E. at 695.
62. Id.
63. 40 S.E.2d 600, 603 (N.C. 1946).
2006]
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vate property by the City of Charlotte to extend sewer services to sixty
non-city residents satisfied the public purpose restrictions for eminent
domain.64 In announcing its decision, the court held:
The public use required need not be the use or benefit of the whole
public or state or any large portion of it. It may be for the inhabitants
of a small or restricted locality; but the use and benefit must be in
common, not to particular individuals or estates. 65
The court again discussed the definitions of public purpose and
public use in Piedmont Triad Airport Authority v. Urbine, when it con-
sidered whether the Piedmont Triad Airport Authority (PTAA) could
condemn private property owned by Kent Urbine to build an
expanded air-cargo terminal for the Federal Express Corporation
(FedEx), a private company and existing tenant at the airport.66
Urbine, the property owner, argued the exercise of eminent domain for
this purpose was unconstitutional because it was not for a "public pur-
pose" as mandated by Article V, Section 2(1) of the North Carolina
Constitution.67
Before the court began its analysis, it noted although there
remained a distinction between "public purpose" and "public use" in
that the former refers to the government's use of tax revenue and the
latter refers to the exercise of eminent domain, the analysis courts use
in determining both is very similar.68 In fact, in Urbine, the court
employed a two-prong test, adapted from one developed in Madison
Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton,69 a traditional "public purpose"
case, to determine whether the PTAA's condemnation of Urbine's
property was for a public use. The court looked at two factors: (1)
whether the condemnation "involves a reasonable connection with the
convenience and necessity of the particular municipality" and (2)
whether "the activity benefits the public generally, as opposed to spe-
cial interest[s] or persons. ' 70
The court, with little analysis, answered the first question in the
affirmative, declaring, "The convenience and necessity of having an
air-cargo facility adjacent to existing airport runways and facilities is
undisputed." 71 In applying the second prong of the test, the court
64. Id. at 605.
65. Id.
66. 554 S.E.2d 331 (N.C. 2001).
67. Id. at 332.
68. Id.
69. 386 S.E.2d 200 (N.C. 1989).
70. Urbine, 554 S.E.2d at 333.
71. Id.
[Vol. 28:291
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noted, "[a]ny determination of what is a public use must rest upon the
notions of the types of activities in which governmental bodies are to
be engaged," and stated such notions could be found by looking to the
state constitution.12 While the North Carolina Constitution contains
an express provision allowing the state to engage in the development
and expansion of airports, the Urbine court held this provision must
be read and interpreted in conjunction with the confines of Article V,
Section 2(1), which requires activities involving the use of state tax
revenue be for a "public purpose.
"r3
The court eschewed concerns the expanded cargo terminal would
be used for the "special interest" of FedEx instead of benefiting the
public generally by noting the PTAA had discussed expanding the ter-
minal before FedEx ever requested it do so. 74 The court concluded the
condemnation sought by the PTAA passed the second prong of the test
and was therefore constitutional. r5
Urbine bears a striking similarity to the final, and perhaps most
important, case this comment considers in this category, Kelo v. City of
New London.76 In many respects, the logic and reasoning contained in
these cases is nearly identical but for the fact the United States
Supreme Court in Kelo sought to determine whether the City of New
London's proposed taking met the "public use" requirement within the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution rather than the
"public purpose" requirement of Article V of the North Carolina Con-
stitution. For instance, both courts endorsed the idea of using the
same test to determine whether a government activity qualifies as a
"public use" or a "public purpose."7 7
Both courts were also forced to confront perceived notions that
private property was being taken by government for the benefit of
another private party rather than for a public use. In Urbine, the court
balanced whether allowing the condemnation of the plaintiffs prop-
72. Id. at 334.
73. Id. ("Reading the Constitution of North Carolina as a whole and giving
significance to each part, we believe that the people did not intend to abrogate the
public purpose doctrine upon the adoption of Article V, Section 13. Article V, Section
2(1) and Article V, Section 13 operate concurrently. To hold otherwise would create a
per se presumption of public purpose and public use under Article V, Section 13 for
any and all undertakings. This would be inconsistent with this Court's holdings that
public purpose and public use cases are to be decided on a case-by-case basis.").
74. Id. at 334-35 ("While the overtures of Federal Express may have hastened the
timing of this development, they are not the genesis of PTAA's actions.").
75. Id. at 335.
76. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
77. Id. at 2662.
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erty so the PTAA could expand an air cargo terminal for a private com-
pany benefited the general public more than the private interests of the
company to be housed in the expanded terminal.78 Similarly, in Kelo,
the Supreme Court dealt with the perceived unfairness associated with
condemning private homes and transferring the property on which
they were located to a private developer who planned to build private
homes and businesses on the property. 79 However, the courts in both
instances had almost identical answers to this concern: "It is only the
taking's purpose, not its mechanics" that matters.80
Despite these similarities, these two cases are very different in the
impact they have on the public purpose doctrine in North Carolina.
The Urbine court, while providing great deference to legislative judg-
ment in determining what governmental activities qualify as a public
purpose, noted that this judgment must ultimately be reviewed by the
courts on a case-by-case basis and that a government activity should
not be considered per se valid simply because a legislative body
endorsed it.81 The Kelo court, however, provided almost total defer-
ence to legislative judgment and rejected the idea of "an artificial
restriction on the concept of public use." '82 The Court outright
rejected a case-by-case judicial review of whether takings are for a pub-
lic use and arguably did what the Urbine court expressly sought not to
do: create a per se presumption any activity in which a legislative body
may engage is a valid public purpose.8 3 In fact, the Supreme Court in
Kelo noted, "the Takings Clause largely operates as a conditional limi-
78. Urbine, 554 S.E.2d at 333 ("The second prong of our analysis requires us to
determine whether the activity benefits the public generally as opposed to special
interests or persons." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
79. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662 ("On the other hand, this is not a case in which the
City is planning to open the condemned land - at least not in its entirety - to use by
the general public. Nor will the private lessees of the land in any sense be required to
operate like common carriers, making their services available to all comers. But
although such a projected use would be sufficient to satisfy the public use
requirement, this Court long ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned
property be put to use for the general public." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
80. Id. at 2664.
81. Urbine, 554 S.E.2d at 334.
82. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667 ("When the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its
means are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom
of takings - no less than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic
legislation - are not to be carried out in the federal courts.").
83. Id. at 2668 ("A constitutional rule that required postponement of the judicial
approval of every condemnation until the likelihood of success of the plan had been
assured would unquestionably impose a significant impediment to the successful
consummation of many such plans.").
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tation, permitting government to do what it wants as long as it pays
the charge."84
While many of the North Carolina cases discussed above contain
dicta or other language suggesting the definitions of public purpose
and public use must necessarily change with the times, the Court in
Kelo rejected any judicial standard or definition of these terms in favor
of complete legislative discretion.8
5
Both Kelo and Urbine provide clear illustrations of how, in the
absence of an absolute and permanent standard for "public purpose,"
politically influential parties, like the developers in these cases, will
have the ability to use the political process to obtain private property
for their own use through eminent domain. Additionally, after Kelo,
not only do these developers have the ability to obtain private property
for development through eminent domain, but they may also, as the
next category of cases demonstrates, be able to use taxpayer funds to
subsidize the redevelopment of that property.
4. Public Purpose in Taxpayer Suits
Lawsuits by taxpayers seeking to enjoin government from spend-
ing money for a particular purpose are the most prolific category of
cases where North Carolina courts have discussed the meaning of the
public purpose doctrine. The first significant case in this category
after Wood, discussed earlier as the foundation of the public purpose
requirement in North Carolina law today, is Briggs v. City of Raleigh.86
In Briggs, the North Carolina Supreme Court held the use of taxpayer
money by the City of Raleigh to finance the construction of a state
fairground qualified as a valid "public purpose."87 The Briggs court, in
approving the expenditure, warned future courts against construing
the public purpose restriction too narrowly.8 8 However, the court also
cautioned against extending its ruling too far, declaring, "Many objects
may be public in the general sense that their attainment will confer a
public benefit or promote the public convenience, but not be public in
the sense that the taxing power of the State may be used to accomplish
84. Id. at 2667 (internal quotation marks omitted).
85. Id. at 2663 ("The disposition of this case therefore turns on the question of
whether the City's development plan serves a 'public purpose.' Without exception, our
cases have defined that concept broadly, reflecting our long-standing policy of
deference to legislative judgments in this field.").
86. 141 S.E. 597 (N.C. 1928).
87. Id. at 599-600.
88. Id. at 599.
2006] 305
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them."8 9 According to Briggs, "It is not necessary, in order that a use
may be regarded as public, that it should be for the use and benefit of
every citizen in the community."90 However, the court in Briggs pro-
nounced a balancing test where "the ultimate advantage of the public
as contrasted with that of the individual" separates those expenditures
that are acceptable public purposes from those that are not.91 When
the outcome of this balancing test is unclear, deference to legislative
determinations should control. 92
Despite giving great deference to legislative bodies to determine
what a public purpose is, the Briggs decision contained strong lan-
guage condemning the use of taxpayer funds to subsidize the activities
of private businesses:
Indeed, it is well settled by all the decisions on the subject, with none
to the contrary, that the power of taxation may not be employed for the
purpose of establishing, aiding or maintaining private business enter-
prises, whose sole object is the individual gain of the proprietors, no
matter how beneficial to the community such enterprises may be....
However important it may be to the community that individual citizens
should prosper in their industrial enterprises, it is not the business of
government to aid them with its means.93
Also significant in Briggs is the court's link between the "public pur-
pose" restriction on the government's power to collect taxes from citi-
zens and its power to exercise eminent domain. The court explicitly
noted, the "same tests must apply to and control in each."94
The court reiterated many of the Briggs directives nineteen years
later when it struck down the use of taxpayer funds to construct a
municipal hotel.95 The court in Nash v. Town of Tarboro ruled in favor
of a taxpayer who alleged Tarboro's decision to issue bonds and levy a
tax to build a city hotel violated the "public purpose" restriction con-
tained in the North Carolina Constitution at the time.96 This ruling
came despite the fact a majority of the town's voters supported build-
89. Id.
90. Id. at 599-600.
91. Id. at 600.
92. Id. ("It is only when the unconstitutionality of an act of the Legislature is clear
that the courts, in the exercise of their judicial powers, are required to hold it for
naught. Hence, every presumption is indulged in favor of the validity of the legislation
called in question.").
93. Id.
94. Id. at 601.
95. Nash v. Town of Tarboro, 42 S.E.2d 209, 214 (N.C. 1947).
96. Id.
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ing the hotel with public funds in a municipal referendum. 97 The Nash
holding was largely based on the fact that no prior precedent had
included the operation of a hotel within the definition of a public pur-
pose98 and noted that a municipality cannot use the power of taxation
to promote business interests when the benefit to taxpayers is merely
"indirect" or "incidental."99
In Mitchell v. North Carolina Industrial Development Financing
Authority, the court again struck down the use of taxpayer funds for
the direct benefit of a private enterprise, when it held an appropriation
of public funds to operate a state economic development agency vio-
lated the public purpose doctrine of the North Carolina Constitu-
tion.'00 The court in Mitchell considered whether the North Carolina
Industrial Financing Authority, created to construct buildings and
other structures to attract business and industry to the state and even-
tually turn those structures over to the private businesses located in
them, constituted a public purpose for which taxpayer money could be
used. 1° 1 In declaring the act that created the development authority
unconstitutional, the court explored the history and application of the
public purpose doctrine in North Carolina and other states, ultimately
deciding "[t]he financing of private enterprise with public funds con-
travenes the fundamental concept of North Carolina's constitution." 102
The court in Mitchell held consent of the citizens through a constitu-
tional amendment was necessary before the state could provide direct
subsidies to private businesses or become involved in the "ownership
and operation of the means of production. 103
Also noteworthy in Mitchell is the court's extension of the analogy
first drawn in Briggs between the constitutional public purpose restric-
tions governing the government's exercise of its power of taxation and
its use of eminent domain. The court in Mitchell noted that if it had
decided the development authority served a valid public purpose and
could use taxpayer funds to support its activities when the authority
sought a location to build a manufacturing plant or other structure for
a private business, then it would also be entitled to use eminent
domain to acquire the property for the structure, since the public pur-
97. Id.
98. Id. at 212.
99. Id. at 214.
100. 159 S.E.2d 745, 761 (N.C. 1968).
101. Id. at 750.
102. id. at 758.
103. Id. at 760.
20061 307
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pose tests underlying both functions are the same. 10 4 This analogy
provides elected officials and courts a valuable vantage point from
which to determine whether a proposed governmental expenditure sat-
isfies the public purpose doctrine, to wit: if eminent domain should
not be used to accomplish it, the expenditure should not qualify as a
public purpose.
Chief Justice R. Hunt Parker, in a dissenting opinion, argued the
court should have considered a different set of factors in determining
whether the development authority served a public purpose, among
them, "the aggregate income it will make available for community dis-
tribution, the resulting security of [citizens'] income, and the opportu-
nities for more lucrative employment for those who desire to work for
it."'1 ° 5 The public purpose doctrine should be construed "in light of
conditions existing today," Parker argued. 10 6
Later cases regarding the public purpose doctrine tended to follow
Justice Parker's dissent in Mitchell rather than the majority opinion. In
Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton, the court declared
establishment of a cable television system by the City of Morganton
constituted a public purpose sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
the North Carolina Constitution. 1 7 The court considered two con-
flicting tests in reaching its decision, one proffered by the defendant
city and the other by the plaintiff, Madison Cablevision, which sought
to preserve its exclusive right to provide cable television services in
Morganton.' 8 The test urged by Madison Cablevision contained three
elements based on the court's language in an earlier case indicating a
preference for allowing government to provide public services only
when the private sector demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to
provide the service.' 0 9 The court rejected this test, arguing it would
call into question the constitutionality of too many public services pro-
vided by government, in favor of a two-prong test followed by North
Carolina courts ever since:
104. Id.
105. Id. at 764 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 770 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
107. 386 S.E.2d 200, 214 (N.C. 1989).
108. Id. at 207.
109. Id. ("Madison Cable contends that a careful reading of this Court's 'public
purpose' decisions suggests that the test of whether an enterprise or activity
constitutes a 'public purpose' is a three-part inquiry: (1) Is the activity one
traditionally performed by the government? (2) Is there a public need for the activity?
and (3) Is private enterprise unwilling or unable to engage in the activity? Plaintiff
contends that unless all three questions can be answered in the affirmative, the activity
or enterprise does not constitute a public purpose.").
308 [Vol. 28:291
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Two guiding principles have been established for determining that a
particular undertaking by a municipality is for a public purpose: (1) it
involves a reasonable connection with the convenience and necessity of
the particular municipality; and (2) the activity benefits the public gen-
erally, as opposed to special interests or persons."
This test was central to the court's decision in its most recent
opinion interpreting the public purpose doctrine, Maready v. City of
Winston-Salem."' The court in Maready upheld the expenditure of
approximately $13.2 million in public funds to provide economic
incentives for certain businesses that agreed locate in Winston-
Salem. 112 The funds were spent pursuant to the authorization of a
state statute permitting municipalities to spend public money to
recruit industry that "will increase the population, taxable property,
agricultural industries and business prospects of any city or
county."'13
In applying the first prong of the Madison Cablevision test, the
court noted "whether an activity is within the appropriate scope of gov-
ernmental involvement and is reasonably related to communal needs
may be evaluated by determining how similar the activity is to others
which this Court has held to be within the permissible realm of gov-
ernmental action. ' 1 4 After listing a number of government expendi-
tures North Carolina courts have upheld as public purposes," 5 the
court in Maready concluded the expenditure of tax revenue to provide
economic incentives for private companies fell within the range of
activities deemed permissible public purposes by the courts." 6
The court also upheld the constitutionality of the incentives upon
applying the second prong of the Madison Cablevision test, holding,
"The public advantages are not indirect, remote, or incidental; rather,
they are directly aimed at furthering the general economic welfare of
the people of the communities affected. While private actors will nec-
essarily benefit from the expenditures authorized, such benefit is
110. Id. (citations omitted).
111. 467 S.E.2d 615, 625 (N.C. 1996).
112. Id. at 631.
113. Id. at 620 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 158-7.1(a) (1994)).
114. Id. at 624.
115. Id. at 623-24 (listing activities North Carolina courts have held qualify as
"public purposes," as follows: aid to a teacher training school; aid to a railroad; airport
facilities; education generally; municipal hospital; public housing; parking; port
terminal facilities; public auditorium; public library; public park; lake and a
generating plant; state fair).
116. Id. at 624.
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merely incidental.""' 7 In addition to adopting the two-prong test from
Madison Cablevision, the Maready court, in reaching its decision, also
reinforced the extreme deference to legislative determinations of what
activities qualify as a public purpose granted by previous courts.""
However, in addition to reinforcing the holdings of prior courts,
the Maready majority opinion outlined another factor for courts to
consider when determining whether a governmental expenditure is for
a public purpose: the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the
legislation." 9 In distinguishing the facts of the principal case from the
facts of Mitchell, where the court expressly decried grants from the
public coffers to private businesses, 120 the Maready majority noted,
"One of the bases for the Mitchell decision was that the General Assem-
bly had unenthusiastically passed the enacting legislation, declaring it
to be bad policy."' 12 ' However, the legislative act authorizing the
expenditures questioned in Maready was "unequivocally
embraced."'
12 2
The Maready dissent criticized the majority's assertion that the
level of lawmakers' enthusiasm in authorizing public expenditures
should be a consideration in determining whether the expenditure is
for a public purpose. 123 The dissent added, "It is evident from a wide
range of sources included in the record that the primary argument for
such assistance to private industry is that 'all the states are doing it'
and, thus, that North Carolina must do it too in order to be
competitive." 1 2 4
Additionally, the Maready dissent took issue with the majority's
application of the second prong of the Madison Cablevision test, argu-
ing the majority's erroneous holding was premised on the incorrect
assumption that "[tihe creation of new jobs and an increase in the tax
base ipso facto benefits the general public.'1 25 Instead, the dissent
argued, empirical data suggested the majority of the benefits from the
117. Id. at 625.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 626 ("Finally, while this Court does not pass upon the wisdom or
propriety of legislation in determining the primary motivation behind a statute, it may
consider the circumstances surrounding its enactment.").
120. Mitchell v. N.C. Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth., 159 S.E.2d 745, 758 (N.C. 1968) ("The
financing of private enterprise with public funds contravenes the fundamental concept
of North Carolina's Constitution.").
121. Maready, 467 S.E.2d at 621.
122. Id. at 622.
123. Id. at 633 (Orr, J., dissenting).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 631.
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$13.2 million incentive package accrued to the private companies
receiving the funds, not the public at large, which enjoyed only a lim-
ited residual benefit from the expenditure of the funds. 12 6 Because the
benefits received by the private companies far outweighed the benefits
received by the general public, the dissent stated the incentives pack-
age in question did not qualify as a public purpose. 1 27
While the North Carolina Supreme Court has not re-examined the
public purpose doctrine in the context of a taxpayer suit since
Maready, the North Carolina Court of Appeals last addressed the issue
in a 2000 taxpayer challenge to the constitutionality of an agreement
entered into by the City of Charlotte with Charlotte Hornets basketball
team owner George Shinn regarding the use of the Charlotte Coli-
seum. 128 In Peacock v. Shinn, the plaintiff-taxpayer alleged provisions
of the agreement giving half of all parking, food, and beverage profits
at the coliseum to Shinn contravened the public purpose provisions of
the Article V of the North Carolina Constitution. 129 The court in Pea-
cock, however, easily upheld the agreement using the two-prong public
purpose test outlined in Madison Cablevision and Maready. 13 0 The
Peacock decision also appeared to endorse the Maready majority's
underlying ends-justifies-the-means philosophy, holding the test for
whether an activity is a public purpose "is whether the transaction will
promote the welfare of the local government and results from the local
government's efforts to better serve the interests of its people."'13 1
Viewed collectively, these cases are demonstrative of the increas-
ing permissiveness with which North Carolina courts have viewed the
scope of the public purpose restrictions contained in the state consti-
tution. While the Wood, Briggs, and Mitchell opinions generally pro-
vided great deference to legislative judgment when deciding whether to
declare an act of the General Assembly appropriating money for a
given purpose unconstitutional, these courts did not hesitate to strike
down legislative appropriations they felt crossed the line from being
for the public good to private gain.
However, beginning with Madison Cablevision and the adoption of
the two-prong public purpose test,132 the courts appear to have granted
126. Id. at 632.
127. Id. at 633.
128. Peacock v. Shinn, 533 S.E.2d 842 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
129. Id. at 845.
130. Id. at 847.
131. Id. at 847-48.
132. Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton, 386 S.E.2d 200, 207 (N.C.
1989).
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a license for legislators to appropriate money for any purpose they
choose, provided some member of the public will benefit. Because the
first prong of the Madison Cablevision test, as defined by the Maready
majority, simply requires courts to look to whether a proposed expen-
diture falls within the range of things deemed public purposes in the
past, 33 anyone utilizing the test is able to analogize any new expendi-
ture to a previously sanctioned one. Moreover, if a direct analogy is
unavailable, the ever-reliable argument "times are changing and the
courts must adapt" has been repeatedly invoked.' 34 The result is that
the Madison Cablevision test is essentially a toothless one-part balanc-
ing test, where the courts must determine whether the benefits accru-
ing to private interests from a government undertaking exceed those
reaching the general public. In essence, this test requires the courts to
second-guess the legislature's policy decisions on a case-by-case basis
and provides no real guidance as to what factors legislators should
weigh before enacting a given piece of legislation to comply with the
public purpose doctrine. The total lack of judicial oversight in this
area endangers the rights of property owners to prevent politically
powerful private parties from using government to not only take their
property through the use of eminent domain, but also to use the public
treasury to finance the redevelopment of that property.
II. MANAGING THE PUBLIC PURPOSE DOCTRINE: A WORKABLE SOLUTION
A. Public Purpose: A Defining Moment
While North Carolina's public purpose doctrine has greatly
evolved since its emergence in the nineteenth century, through all of
these changes the doctrine was meant to serve as a clear restriction for
lawmakers. Over time, however, courts have gradually loosened these
restraints upon lawmakers to the point that today it appears the public
purpose doctrine is more of a suggestion than a concrete rule.
The term "public purpose" can mean different things in different
contexts. As established above, the courts have implicitly recognized
that as government has continually grown and become increasingly
intertwined in the state's economic life and the lives of North Carolina
citizens, not all government activities may qualify as public purposes
in the traditional sense. 135 Government activities that are not public
133. Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615, 624 (N.C. 1996).
134. See, e.g., Madison, 386 S.E.2d at 210; Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct.
2655, 2665-66 (2005).
135. See, e.g., In re Appeal of Univ. of North Carolina, 268 S.E.2d 472, 479 (N.C.
1980) (recognizing that all state government property may not be used for traditional
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purposes may further include those where citizens pay a user fee or
otherwise absorb most or all of the total cost of the activity or service,
often with insignificant subsidy from general tax revenues.
136
However, most governmental activities must necessarily fall
within the scope of those that are "public purposes." Among these
activities, the courts have determined at least two types exist: govern-
mental functions and proprietary functions. Governmental functions
encompass those activities or services traditionally paid for and used
by everyone, such as roads, traffic lights, jails, and police. 137 Proprie-
tary functions include all of those governmental undertakings denoted
by statute as "public enterprises" and similar activities such as electri-
cal service, generally paid for by those who use them but also subsi-
dized in part with general tax revenues.
138
Labeling proprietary functions "public purposes" is arguably a
misnomer. Black's Law Dictionary defines the word "public" as
"Jr]elating or belonging to an entire community, state, or nation" and
"[o]pen or available for all to use, share, or enjoy." 139 In fact, many
proprietary services do not fit this definition at all. The electricity pro-
duced by a municipal electric service, for example, is available only to
those who are within the service area and is available for use only
insofar as those who use it pay for the amount they use.
By increasingly expanding the definition of public purpose to
encompass these non-traditional governmental functions, a danger
arises that courts and legislators could construe this label to mean
these activities should be afforded the same protections and advan-
tages as traditional public purposes, including the right to use eminent
domain and taxpayer money to accomplish them. Urban redevelop-
ment and economic development activities, which in some cases are
"governmental" purposes, but mandating that all such property is exempt from
taxation by virtue of its ownership by the state).
136. See, e.g., Sides v. Cabarrus Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 213 S.E.2d 297, 302 (N.C. 1975)
("Nonetheless, an analysis of the various activities that this Court has held to be
proprietary in nature reveals that they involved a monetary charge of some type."
(citations omitted)).
137. See, e.g., id. at 303 ("Furthermore, it appears that all of the activities held to be
governmental functions by this Court are those historically performed by government,
and which are not ordinarily engaged in by private corporations.").
138. See, e.g., Pulliam v. City of Greensboro, 407 S.E.2d 567, 569-70 (N.C. Ct. App.
1991) ("Thus it seems to be an accepted practice in North Carolina for cities and
towns to compete with private enterprise by the ownership and operation of these
public enterprises recognized by the General Assembly. Additionally, our courts have
clearly stated that in setting rates for public enterprise services, municipalities act in a
proprietary role.").
139. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1264 (8th ed. 2004).
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even designated by statute as public uses or public purposes, 140 fall
into this category of non-traditional government functions.
In considering an appropriate definition of "public purpose,"
which allows the term to serve as a useful restriction on governmental
activity while still providing deference to legislative judgment, five
principles originally set out by the courts in Wood and Topeka provide
the best foundation. According to these two cases, a public purpose is
a governmental expenditure or activity that is: (1) made for a public
improvement or advantage; 141 (2) provided for and promoting the gen-
eral good, convenience, and safety of the citizens; 14 2 (3) necessary to
the support and for the proper use of government; 143 (4) consistent
with the history and traditions of government; 144 and (5) the advan-
tages of which need not reach every citizen to promote the general
good. 145
Of these five principles, the last presents the most difficulty in
determining whether a government activity is for a public purpose.
Neither the courts nor legislators can seem to reach a consensus as to
exactly how much an activity can benefit a particular individual, cor-
poration, or group before it falls outside the realm of a public purpose
and becomes primarily for private gain. Additionally, it is not clear
how small or narrow a category of citizens can be to reap the advan-
tages of a given government activity for it to qualify as a public pur-
pose. Any new definition of public purpose should address this
problem and provide a clear balancing test to determine how much an
activity can benefit a particular minority of citizens in comparison to
the benefits derived by the general public before government should
no longer perform it. In the meantime, it is up to the courts to apply a
public purpose test stringently enough to safeguard private property
and ensure that taxpayer funds are, in fact, used for the public good
instead of private gain.
B. The Test for Public Purpose
As it now stands, the two-prong Madison Cablevision test is
applied in nearly every case where the public purpose doctrine is at
140. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-501 (2005) ("[Urban redevelopment activities]
are hereby declared to be public uses for which public money may be spent, and
private property may be acquired by the exercise of the power of eminent domain.").
141. Wood v. Oxford, 2 S.E. 653, 655 (N.C. 1887).
142. Id.
143. Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 665 (1875).
144. Id.
145. Wood, 2 S.E. at 655.
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issue, no matter what governmental activity is in question. 146 How-
ever, as established above, this test essentially amounts to nothing
more than a balancing test requiring courts to decide whether a legisla-
tive body correctly decided that an activity benefited the general public
more than some private party. Since this test appears solidly rooted in
North Carolina jurisprudence and completely overhauling it would call
for a significant departure from judicial precedent, courts should use a
far greater level of scrutiny and make additional considerations when
applying both prongs of the test.
In applying the first prong of the test, courts should seek to deter-
mine whether a reasonable connection with the convenience and
necessity of a particular area exists by closely analyzing whether the
governmental activity in question truly fits clearly within the history
and traditions of government. If the activity does not fall clearly
within these parameters, it should be struck down. Courts have been
far too willing to expand the class of activities qualifying as public pur-
poses in the name of "progress" or on the basis that "all the states are
doing it."'4 7 In determining the convenience and necessity of an activ-
ity, courts should heed the advice of the court in Mitchell: if eminent
domain shouldn't be used to accomplish it, the activity shouldn't qual-
ify as a public purpose.' 4 ' When viewing the convenience and neces-
sity of a government action in this context, it is likely many courts
would hold the recent incentives packages granted to entice business
to locate in the state not necessary.
In applying the second prong of the Madison Cablevision test,
courts should adopt the Wells public-purpose test that looks to the end
to be reached and the means to be used to accomplish a given activ-
ity. 14 9 If neither the means nor the end appears to benefit the public
generally, the activity should be declared unconstitutional.
More importantly, however, this prong of the test turns on the
balance between public and private benefits that result from a govern-
mental undertaking. The Maready and Urbine courts seemed willing
to simply eyeball this balancing test, assuming that economic develop-
146. See, e.g,, Piedmont Triad Airport Auth. v. Urbine, 554 S.E.2d 331, 333 (N.C.
2001); Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615, 624 (N.C. 1996).
147. Maready, 467 S.E.2d at 633.
148. Mitchell v. N.C. Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth., 159 S.E.2d 745, 760 (N.C. 1968) ("In
passing upon the validity of an act, this Court must consider the consequences of its
decision. Were we to hold that Authority serves a public purpose when it acquires a
site, constructs a manufacturing plant, and leases it to a private enterprise, we would
thereby authorize the legislature to give Authority the power to condemn private
property for any project which it undertook.").
149. Wells v. Hous. Auth., 190 S.E. 692, 695 (N.C. 1938).
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ment and job creation carried a far greater benefit to the public as a
whole than to the individual companies who also profited from the
government's actions in those cases. However, the Maready dissent
used empirical data to reach the opposite conclusion. 150 Without the
use of such empirical data to determine exactly how much of a benefit
citizens actually receive from a governmental action, it seems courts
are largely in the dark when attempting to apply this balancing test.
Therefore, courts would be well advised to seek out empirical data
when applying this prong of the Madison Cablevision test in future
cases and require a clear benefit to the public before deciding an
expenditure is for a public purpose. The courts should also revive the
guidelines outlined by the Nash court requiring the benefits to taxpay-
ers from a government expenditure not be merely "indirect" or
"incidental.' '1 51
Finally, courts should apply a heightened level of scrutiny to any
case where public funds or property acquired through eminent
domain flow directly to a private party, especially when that party is
politically influential. Such a scenario should serve as a warning sign
to courts that the true intent behind a governmental activity may be to
benefit a special interest, not the general public.
C. A Time for Action: The Kelo Wake-Up Call
While Wood and Topeka provide a foundational basis for defining
"public purpose," the legislature should formulate a more precise defi-
nition in accordance with the desires of North Carolina citizens. In
formulating this definition, legislators should keep in mind the lessons
learned from Kelo, and construct a framework for public purpose suf-
ficiently narrow to protect private property rights but with enough lee-
way to allow government to perform its essential functions. Once that
definition is established, it should be proposed as an amendment to
the North Carolina Constitution to give courts clear guidance in decid-
ing whether a government activity constitutes a public purpose to sat-
isfy constitutional requirements. Such an amendment would not
conflict with the edicts of the Supreme Court's holding in Kelo, as the
Court clearly noted, "[N]othing in our opinion precludes any State
from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings
power."' 52 This amendment seems especially necessary in light of the
North Carolina Supreme Court's rulings in Mitchell and Maready,
150. Maready, 467 S.E.2d at 631-35.
151. Nash v. Town of Tarboro, 42 S.E.2d 209, 214 (N.C. 1947).
152. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005).
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which, taken together, appear to permit economic development as a
justification for taking private property under the state's eminent
domain laws. 153 Although Urbine is the only case to reach North Caro-
lina's appellate courts in the past decade where a government entity
has arguably used eminent domain to take private property from one
private party for the benefit of another using economic development as
a justification, it is not inconceivable government entities and the
courts will be emboldened to allow such takings after Kelo. While out-
rage over the Kelo decision is still fresh in the public mind, those in
positions of government authority, especially elected officials, are
likely to tread lightly when dealing with issues of public purpose and
in balancing the rights of private property owners with the govern-
ment's interest in creating jobs and promoting economic development.
However, as the memory of Kelo slowly fades, the seemingly endless
erosion the public purpose doctrine has suffered at the hands of the
courts and legislative bodies in North Carolina and throughout the
nation is likely to continue. As financial incentive packages continue
to grow, it seems there are very few limits as to what North Carolina
governmental bodies will do to attract business to the state or a partic-
ular locality.
CONCLUSION
While the "public purpose" doctrine has been gradually eroded by
the courts over the last several decades, there has never been a better
time to reverse this trend. The nearly universal outrage brought on by
the Kelo decision creates an unprecedented opportunity to address the
problem of an ever-expanding judicial and legislative view of what con-
stitutes a "public purpose."
With this issue now at the fore, members of the public have a clear
idea of the real-life consequences the definition of this relatively
abstract term can have on their individual rights. Specifically, Kelo
demonstrated if the public purpose restrictions on eminent domain
are applied with little fortitude by the courts, then politically powerful
individuals can use the political process to subvert the property rights
of citizens. Similarly, the recent rash of business incentives packages
granted to entice business to locate in the state demonstrates the abil-
153. As discussed above, Maready established the principle that economic
development in the form of financial incentives to private companies was a "public
purpose" within the meaning of the North Carolina Constitution. Additionally, the
Mitchell court held that once it is determined that a governmental expenditure is for a
public purpose, government bodies in the state may use eminent domain to
accomplish the purpose of the expenditure. See supra Part I.B.4.
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ity of large corporations to wield power and influence to gain access to
the public coffers, with little thought given by lawmakers as to how
much the money they are granted will truly benefit the general public.
The North Carolina General Assembly should use this historic
opportunity to revive the public purpose doctrine by clearly defining it
and proposing a constitutional amendment containing this definition.
If courts have clear guidance as to what activities qualify as a public
purpose under North Carolina's constitution, outcomes like the Kelo
decision will be avoided and citizens can rest assured their property
will neither be taken nor taxed for anything other than a true public
purpose.
Michael McKnight
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